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MR. JUSTICE HOLMES-HUMILITY,
SKEPTICISM AND DEMOCRACY
WALLACE MENDELSON*
l HARACTER is fate and so is circumstance. A great man is one
whose personal qualities satisfy the pressing needs of a par-
ticular tactical engagement in the continuing campaign of history.
Early in the Twentieth Century Oliver Wendell Holmes brought to
the Supreme Court of the nation two striking qualities, skepticism
and intellectual humility-perfect solvents for the economic dogma-
tism which under the mask of Natural or Divine Law had permeated
both bench and bar. In the preceding quarter of a century the
judiciary had got into the habit of treating Adam Smith "as though
his generalizations had been imparted to him on Sinai and not as
a thinker who addressed himself to the elimination of restrictions
which had become fetters upon initiative and enterprise in his day.
Basic human rights expressed by the constitutional conception of
liberty were equated with theories of laissez-faire .... The result
was that economic views of confined validity were treated by law-
yers and judges as though the Framers had enshrined them in the
Constitution. This misapplication of the notions of the classic econ-
omists and resulting disregard of the perduring reach of the Con-
stitution"' was strangling the growth of the nation and frustrating
the processes of democracy.
In origin laissez-faire was a reaction to mercantilism. It contem-
plated a termination of governmental handouts for business. The
economy was to stand on its own feet independent of tariffs, mon-
opolistic grants, special trading privileges and other public bounties.
It was in this sense that Jefferson and Jackson-radicals in their
day-had sponsored the philosophy of laissez-faire. But to fight
one's battles under the enemy's banner is an old strategy. By the
end of the Nineteenth Century businessmen had taken over laissez-
faire for their own, twisting it into a defense against democratic
efforts to regulate business for the protection of the public. For in
the interim since Jackson's day de Tocqueville's prophesy had
proven true; the masses refused "to remain miserable and sov-
ereign." And so it happened, as Bryce observed in 1888, "one-half
*Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Tennessee.
1. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter in A. F. of L. v. American Sash & Door
Co., 335 U. S. 538, 542 (1949) (concurring opinion).
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of the capitalists are occupied in preaching laissez-faire as regards
railroad control, the other in resisting it-in tariff matters .... Yet
they manage to hold well together." Businessmen found their great
spokesman in an English philosopher-biologist, Herbert Spencer,
who incidentally was "rejected by professional philosophers as
superficial and by scientists as ignorant." In his hands Darwin's
struggle for existence and survival of the fittest became a natural
law of social organization. As such it provided cosmic justification
for the Robber Baron's greedy exploitation of the nation's human
and geographic resources. "Their cupidity, it defended as part of
the universal struggle for existence; their wealth, it hallowed as
the sign of the fittest." Governmental interference for the protection
of the public was a violation oE nature and as such doomed to bring
more hardship than good, for "the poverty of the incapable, the
distresses that come upon the improvident, the starvation of the
idle, and the shouldering aside of the weak by the strong, which
leaves so many in shadows and misery are the decrees of a large,
far-seeing benevolence ... ."2 As a present day Congressman put it,
"Every one for himself, said the elephant, as he danced among the
chickens."
When Mr. Justice Holmes took his seat upon the Supreme
Court bench in 1902 this pseudo-laissez-faire had been absorbed
into the law of the land, particularly into the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. In its name the judiciary had frus-
trated numerous popular efforts to mitigate the more obvious
abuses of the American industrial revolution. Specifically during
the last five years of the Nineteenth Century the Supreme Court
had destroyed or emasculated legislative attempts to control mon-
opoly,3 prevent unfair railroad rates,4 tax incomes or regulate util-
ities6 and insurance companies.7 But while "laissez-faire" on the
bench meant exemption of business from the processes of democratic
government, it subjected workingmen to extra-democratic pro-
cesses, namely, government by injunction.8 Thus the standard was
double, working uniformly for the benefit of those who by popular
2. This and the foregoing non-footnoted quotations appear in Mason,
Free Government in the Making c. 16 (1949).
3. United States v. E. C. McKnight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (1895).
4. Maximum Rate Case, 167 U. S. 479 (1897) ; Social Circle Case, 162
U. S. 184 (1896) ; Texas & Pacific Ry. v. I. C. C., 162, 197 (1896).
5. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U. S. 601 (1895).
6. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (1898).
7. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578 (1897).
8. In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895).
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standards already had too many advantages. President Hadley re-
vealed the temper of the times when he claimed that "the funda-
mental division of powers in the Constitution of the United States
is between voters on the one hand and property owners on the
other. The forces of democracy on the one side, divided between
the executive and the legislature, are set over against the forces
of property on the other side with the judiciary as arbiter between
them. . . ."g-which was, of course, the way the wealthy looked at it.
For to make "laissez-faire" the "arbiter" between democracy and
property meant the latter would win all engagements. As Mr.
Justice Holmes put it;
"I suspect that this fear [of "socialism" on the part of the
"comfortable classes"] has influenced judicial action both here
and in England.... I think that something similar has led people
who no longer hope to control the legislatures to look to the
courts as expounders of the Constitutions, and that in some
courts new principles have been discovered outside of the bodies
of those instruments, which may be generalized into acceptance
of the economic doctrines which prevailed about fifty years ago,
and a wholesale prohibition of what a tribunal of lawyers does
not think about right."'10
The judicial genius of Holmes did not lie in a questioning of
the new laissez-faire. 1' For while he was apt to express himself
more subtly than spokesmen for the Robber Barons, it is clear that
he was in fundamental agreement with them on the major tenets of
Spencerian doctrine. The Justice was a true product of the age of
Darwin. For him "the struggle for life is the order of the world...
man's destiny in battle.' 2 He put his hopes in racial improvement,
not in alterations of human institutions. Time after time he repeated
Spencer's warning that in society, as in mechanics, there is no way
to get something for nothing. Human efforts to ameliorate the
"struggle for existence" merely beget new woes (or rather shift
old ones) and society must inevitably foot the bill. Hence the deep
Holmesian skepticism towards reform and especially reformers-
"cock-sure of a thousand reforms," "the greatest bores in the
world :"
"The social reformers of today seem to me so far to forget
that we no more can get something for nothing by legislation
than we can by mechanics as to be satisfied if the bill to be paid
9. Mason, op. cit. supra, c. 16.
10. Holmes, The Path of the Law in Collected Legal Papers 184 (1920).
11. 2 Holmes-Pollock Letters 309 (Howe ed. 1941). The acceptance of
laissey-faire is implicit in many of his opinions and other writings.
12. Speeches 58 (1913).
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for their improvements is not presented in a lump sum. Inter-
stitial detriments that may far outweigh the benefit promised
are not bothered about. Probably I am too skeptical as to our
ability to do more than shift disagreeable burdens from the
shoulders of the stronger to those of the weaker .... I believe
that the wholesale social regeneration which so many now
seem to expect, if it can be helped by conscious, coordinated
human effort, cannot be affected appreciably by tinkering with
the institution of property, but only by taking in hand life and
trying to build a race.... The notion that with socialized prop-
erty we should have women free and a piano for everybody
seems to me an empty humbug. 13
"... most even of the enlightened reformers ... seem to me
not to have considered with accuracy the means at our disposal
and to become rhetorical where I want figures. The notion that
we can secure an economic paradise by changes in property
alone seem to me twaddle. I can understand better legislation
that aims rather to improve the quality . . . of the population.
If before the English factory acts the race was running down
physically I can understand taking the economic risk of passing
those acts-although they had to be paid for, and I do not doubt
in some way or other England was worse off for them, however
favorable the balance of account. I can understand a man's
saying in any case, I want this or that and I am willing to pay
the price, if he realizes what the price is. What I most fear is
saying the same thing when those who say it do not know and
have made no serious effort to find out what it will cost, as I
think we in this country rather inclined to do.' 1 4
But, fundamentally in accord with the doctrines of laissez-faire,
Holmes had learned what Morris Cohen called "the great lesson
of life," namely, humility. Arid so, man and judge, he refused to
act as though he, or indeed anyone, held an exclusive compass of
truth :
"When I say a thing is true, I mean that I cannot help
believing it. I am stating an experience as to which there is no
choice. But as there are many things that I cannot help doing
that the universe can, I do not venture to assume that my in-
abilities in the way of thought are inabilities of the universe. I
therefore define truth as the system of my limitations, and leave
absolute truth for those who are better equipped .... To have
doubted one's own first -principles is the mark of a civilized
man.' 5
13. Holmes, Ideals and Doubts in Collected Legal Papers 305-306
(1920).
14. Reproduced in Lerner, The Mind and Faith of 'Mr. Justice Holmes
400-401 (1943).
15. Holmes, Ideals and Doubts in Collected Legal Papers 303, 307
(1920).
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"Certitude is not the test of certainty. We have been cock-
sure of many things that were not so. .. . What we most love
and revere generally is determined by early associations ...
But while one's experience thus makes certain preferences dog-
matic for one's self, recognition of how they came to be so leaves
one able to see that others, poor souls, may be equally dogmatic
about something else."'16
It is this humility, this refusal to read his own experiences and
beliefs (what he called his "can't helps") into the Constitution, and
his alertness in opposing judicial associates who, often unconscious-
ly, did so, that constitutes the genius of Holmes. He did not con-
fuse his personal distastes with constitutional necessity. And so
when his associates read a pseudo-laissez-faire into the law of the
land, and showed marked hostility to offensive speech, Holmes was
apt to be in dissent. But he was outspokenly skeptical of the re-
forms envolved in most of the great opinions which he wrote in
support of legislative freedom to adopt them; as in the famous free
speech dissents he openly disdained the ideas whose utterance
he defended. Thus on a bedrock of humility and skepticism Holmes
laid the foundation for an abiding democratic philosophy. "Just as
he would allow experiments in economics which he himself viewed
with doubt and distrust, so he would protect speech that offended
his taste and wisdom. At bottom both attitudes came from a cen-
tral faith and a governing skepticism. Since the whole truth has
not yet been, and is not likely to be, brought up from its bottomless
well, the first duty of an educated man was to doubt his major
premise even while he continued to act upon it. This was the
skeptical conviction with which he distrusted dogma, whether
economic or intellectual. But his was never the paralyzing skepti-
cism which easily becomes comfortable or corroding cynicism. He
had a positive faith-faith in the gradual power to pierce nature's
mysteries through man's indomitable endeavors. This was the road
by which he reached an attitude of widest tolerance towards views
which were strange and uncongenial to him, lest by a premature
stifling even of crude or groping ideas society might be deprived
of eventual wisdom for attaining a gracious civilization.' 17 In a
word, free speech, press and assembly are indispensable tools of
democratic self-government for they safeguard society's thinking
16. Id. at 311.
17. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court 61-62
(1938).
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process. And so it is one thing for judges to protect free expression
from legislative mutilation, bu': to strike down the legislative fruits
which free expression bears in the economic realm-wage and hour
laws, for example-is something quite different. For neither
democracy nor free expression have meaning, if judges are to sub-
stitute their views ("can't helps") for those adopted by a com-
munity whose channels of discussion and thought are unobstructed.
From that premise spring the two famous rules-clear and pres-
ent danger and reasonable man-which Holmes urged for guiding
and limiting judges in the exercise of their power of judicial re-
view; the power, that is, to impede the forces of democracy, to
block the rights of self-government. For it seemed to the Justice
that, "as the decisions now stand .... [there is] hardly any limit
but the sky to the invalidating of those rights if they happen to
strike a majority of this Court as for any reason undesirable."1
The more fundamental of Holmes' two famous rules was that
designed to determine the bounds of what men may speak or write
in a democratic society. To be sure the First Amendment speaks
in absolute terms--"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging"
free discussion. But life and society are dynamic processes which
neither we, nor least of all the Founding Fathers, could hope to
imprison in a phrase of a dozen words. In constitutions particu-
larly it is the essence behind the words that counts; often "the let-
ter killeth." The function of the great judge is to "preserve his
authority by cloaking himself in the majesty of an overshadowing
past; but he must discover some composition with the dominant
trends of his time-at all hazards he must maintain that tolerable
continuity without which society dissolves, and man must begin
again the weary path up from savagery." 19
Looking behind the simple language of the First Amendment
Holmes found in its free expression provisions a plain purpose-to
safeguard society's thinking process, no more and no less. Thus
he who seeks to debate public issues is protected, however out-
rageous a judge or legislature may find his views. But he who
would incite improper action, though he do so via speech, has no
claim to immunity from punishment or prohibition. Falsely crying
fire in a crowded theater is riot calculated to start an intellectual
18. See Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 595 (1930) (dissenting
opinion).
19. Hand, Mr. Justice Cardoro, 48 Yale L. J. 379 (1939).
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discussion; it is no part of the process by which truth is brought
up from its bottomless well; hence like other anti-social action, it
is subject to public restraint. The extreme cases are always easy.
It is at the penumbra that the line is difficult to trace. To dis-
tinguish between discussion words and "words that may have all
the effect of force" Holmes, in the case of Schenck v. United States,
devised the clear and present danger rule:
".*. the character of every act depends upon the circum-
stances in which it was done. . . . The most stringent protec-
tion of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting
fire in a theater, and causing a panic. It does not even protect
a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have
all the effect of force .... The question in every case is whether
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such
a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. '20
That was the first laconic statement of principle. Thereafter in
a series of brilliant dissents and separate concurring opinions 21
Justices Holmes and/or Brandeis spelled out some of its implica-
tions in language that is not apt to be forgotten.
It is noteworthy that after the Schenck case while Holmes and
Brandeis were on the bench no other Justice supported the danger
rule. In five more Espionage Act cases22 decided in 1919-1920 the
Schenck decision was cited by the Court as controlling, but the
danger test was not mentioned and none of the evidence was
analyzed in danger terms. In each instance convictions were sus-
tained. Thus for all but one of his associates Holmes' formula was
at best an acceptable device for sending men to jail and nothing
more. In the throes of World War I and its aftermath, when free
speech was jeopardized by popular hysteria as never before in
American history, a majority of the Justices were willing to up-
hold punishment for speech merely because of its supposed "bad
20. 249 U. S. 47 (1919).
21. Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927) ; Gitlow v. New York,
268 U. S. 652 (1925) ; Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325 (1920) ; Pierce v.
United States, 252 U. S. 239 (1920) ; Schaefer v. United States, 251 U. S.
468 (1920) ; Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616 (1919).
22. Debs v. United States, 249 U. S. 211 (1919) ; Frowerk v. United
States, 249 U. S. 204 (1919) ; Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616 (1919) ;
Schaefer v. United States, 251 U. S. 466, 468 (1920) ; Pierce v. United States,
252 U. S. 239 (1920). In Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925) the court
mentioned the danger test only to distinguish it to permit upholding a conviction.
1952]
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tendency"2 3-a complete repudiation, one submits, both of the
language and the substance of the First Amendment. Progress
marches with the sword of criticism and must of necessity threaten
anguish for the status quo. From time immemorial its "tendency"
has been "bad." And so Holmes saw "misfortune if a judge reads
his conscious or unconscious sympathy with one side or the other
prematurely into the law, and forgets that what seem to him to be
first principles are believed by half his fellow men to be wrong. I
think that we have suffered from this misfortune ... and that this
is another very important truth to be extracted from the popular
discontent. When twenty years ago a vague terror went over the
earth and the word socialism began to be heard, I thought and still
think that fear was translated into doctrines that had no proper
place in the Constitution or the common law. Judges are apt to be
naive, simple-minded men, and they need something of Mephisto-
pheles. We too need education in the obvious-to learn to transcend
our own convictions and to leave room for much that we hold dear
to be done. away with short of revolution by the orderly change of
law." 24 But Mr. Justice Brandeis, more fervent, more loquatious
and more disposed to stoop for detail than Holmes, gave the
clear and present danger rule its ultimate formulation:
"Those who won our independence believed that the final
end of the State was to make men free to develop their facul-
ties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should
prevail over the arbitrary. . . .They believed that freedom to
think as you will and speak as you think are means indispensable
to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without
free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with
them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against
the dissemination of noxious doctrine .... they knew that it is
hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that
fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate
menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the
opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed
remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good
ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied through pub-
lic discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law-the argu-
ment of force in its worst form."
"Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of
free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women.
It is the function of free speech to free men from the bondage
23. This position is seen most clearly in Gitlow v. New York, 26S U. S.
652 (1925).
24. Speeches 101-102 (1913).
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of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there
must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result
if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to
believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must
be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is
a serious one. Every denunciation of existing law tends in some
measure to increase the probability that there will be violation
of it. Condonation of a breach enhances the probability. Propa-
gation of the criminal state of mind by teaching syndicalism
increases it. Advocacy of law-breaking heightens it still further.
But even advocacy of violation, however reprehensible morally,
is not a justification for denying free speech where the advocacy
falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that
the advocacy would be immediately acted on. The wide differ-
ence between advocacy and incitement, between preparation and
attempt, between assembling and conspiracy must be borne in
mind. In order to support a finding of clear and present danger
it must be shown either that immediate serious violence was to
be expected or was advocated, or that the past conduct furnished
reason to believe that such advocacy was then contemplated."
"Those who won our independence by revolution were not
cowards. They did not fear political change. They did not exalt
order at the cost of liberty. To courageous, self-reliant men,
with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning ap-
plied through the processes of popular government, no danger
flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless
the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may
befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there
be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies,
to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be
applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emer-
gency can justify repression. Such must be the rule if authority
is to be reconciled with freedom. Such, in my opinion, is the
command of the Constitution. It is therefore always open to
Americans to challenge a law abridging free speech and assem-
bly by showing that there was no emergency justifying it."
"Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to
prohibition of these functions essential to effective democracy,
unless the evil apprehended is relatively serious. Prohibition of
free speech is a measure so stringent that it would be inappro-
priate as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to
society."25
The upshot of Holmes' position then was that advocacy is to be
free up to that last possible point where it merges into action so
immediately dangerous that there is no opportunity for the demo-
cratic corrective of counter discussion. For the Justice knew all
25. Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927).
19521
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too well that history is strewn with the maimed and tortured bodies
of men who dared to question "eternal truths" which as it turned
out were somewhat less than eternally true. "When men have
realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached
by free trade in ideas,-that the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market;
and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely
can be carried out." 26
But the apercus, even the rhetoric, of the master often become
dogma in the hands of his disciples. For Holmes, in contrast to
some of his successors, the precept of clear and present danger was
one of limited applicability. The Justice used it as a guide for
judges in the application of espionage and criminal syndicalism
statutes to particular factual situations-an adaptation of the com-
mon law principles of incitement to crime. Unfettered discussion
is "essential to democracy," but inducing illegal action is not. The
danger rule was Holmes' litmus for fixing the point at which words
cease to be "keys of persuasion" and become "triggers of [illegal]
action." But he neither held nor implied that incitement to crime
was the only basis for restraint of utterance. That was merely a
particular application of a: general principle, namely, that democ-
racy need not tolerate abuse or perversion of its freedoms.
Certainly there are many abuses which cannot be measured in
terms of incitement and danger. When a state's interests in edu-
cating its youngsters in English was subsumed by the Court to a
Lutheran parochial school teacher's interest in teaching and ex-
pressing himself in German, Mr. Justice Holmes dissented on
reasonable basis grounds . 2 7 He did not attempt to weigh the con-
flicting interests in danger test terms as some of his successors did
in the comparable Flag Salute litigation.2 That the danger test
26. Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616 (1919).
27. Meyers v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923).
28. West Virginia Bd. of Education v. Banette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943).
The public interest involved is much the same in both cases, though the
private interests differ somewhat. The Flag Salute was treated as a problem
of religious freedom, while in the Meyer case the economic interest of the
teacher was emphasized, though there are clear civil liberty overtones. The
emphasis on economics is explained by the fact that as of 1923 the Court
had not yet been willing to bring civil liberty within the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment. When it (lid so two years later, the Meyer case and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925) based uipon it, "cleared
the ground" for that result. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 321-
322 (1942).
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reveals no imminent danger (abuse) in such circumstances is no
more significant than failure of a barometer to disclose an im-
pending avalanch. Holmes' danger test is meaningless in contexts
where there is no problem of inducement or incitement to crime.
Of course the Constitution does not protect "force-words," but
neither does it forbid majorities to be "foolish." It merely re-
quires that dissenters be free to make the most of such "foolish-
ness" argumentatively. Forbidding "free speech" in German did
not hobble society's thinking process. No ideas were repressed.
No one was denied liberty to participate in the political processes,
nor to attempt to change public opinion. In short the purpose of
the free expression clauses was not violated. Similarly on the
Massachusetts Supreme Court Holmes upheld, as reasonable, state
efforts to forbid certain political activities by policemen 29 and to
restrict speech-making on Boston Commons.3" Clearly the Justice
distinguished between restrictions on ideas and mere regulation
of modes of expression. Only when the governmental thrust was
against an idea as such did Holmes apply the danger test-his
purpose being to give ideas full protection up to that final point
where they merge into misconduct. But when the public animus
was not censorious in purpose or substantial effect, when it was di-
rected merely against impropriety in terms of time, place or manner
of expression, Holmes' chiterion was the less stringent reasonable
man test.31
"Congress [like the states] certainly cannot forbid all effort to
change the mind of the country." 32 The democratic political pro-
cesses require substantial opportunity for public discussion of all
ideas. But those processes are not materially impeded when, for
example, the public sets aside a park to furnish opportunity for
repose free from political or religious polemics. 3 The most that a
court may ask in such circumstances is whether there are reasonable
opportunities for adequate public discussion elsewhere.
When after a long period of neglect the danger approach was
resurrected by a quartet of libertarians in the 1940's, the distinction
between restraints upon a speaker's mind and restraints upon his
29. McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216 (1891).
30. Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510 (1895).
31. Holmes' vote in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925)
seems to indicate simply that he saw in Ku Klux Klan inspired legislation
there involved more than a mere attempt to regulate modes of expression.
32. Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 628 (1919).
33. Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510 (1895) ; cf. Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949) ; Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948).
1952]
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manners was lost. The resulting perversion of Holmes' danger
test into a formula of general coverage is the source of the "Roose-
velt Court's" civil liberty troubles, leading to such anarchic results
as to make a mockery of trial procedure,3 4 privacy of the home, 5
or safeguards against crooked labor organizers.36 It is one thing
to hold with Holmes that clear and present danger justifies re-
striction. It is something quite different to hold that no restriction
is permissible in the absence of imminent danger-which is just
about the position of some members of the Roosevelt Court. The
danger test simply is not sensitive to an avalanch of non-violent
abuse, nor was it designed to be.
But if Mr. Justice Holmes tried to narrow the range of legisla-
tive restraints upon ideas, he sought simultaneously to leave broad
scope for legislative experiments in economic control. His double
standard was grounded both in the meaning of democracy (as we
have seen) and the language of the Constitution. For the First
Amendment speaks in far pliner terms than do the due process
clauses.36a Indeed any economic content which the Court "found" in
due process it put there. Only very late in the history of that
ancient concept did it become the embodiment of the dogmas of
pseudo-laissez-faire. Such improvization by the judicial process of
inclusion and exclusion, such bald, unlimited Constitution-making
by judges in defiance of universal democratic trends was more
than Holmes could abide:
"The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics .... Some of these laws embody con-
victions or prejudices which judges are likely to share. Some
may not. But a constitution is not intended to embody a par-
ticular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic
relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire. It is made
for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident
of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel
and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon
the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with
the Constitution of the United States.13 7
For many, perhaps most, of its ardent advocates "state's rights"
does not mean freedom for a state to govern itself. They use the
34. Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367 (1947).
35. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943).
36. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945).
36a. As to Holmes' grounds ior reading free speech into the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S.
652, 672 (1925) (dissenting opinion).
37. See Lockner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 74, 75-76 (1905) (dissent-
ing opinion).
[Vol. 36:343
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES
term merely as a club to beat Congress over the head. For when
states do attempt positively to use their reserved powers, "states
righters" are apt to be among the first to denounce the effort as an
interference with "natural rights" of individuals. For Holmes,
freedom for positive local self-government was real:
"We fear to grant power and are unwilling to recognize it
when it exists.... when legislatures are held to be authorized
to do anything considerably affecting public welfare it is cov-
ered by apologetic phrases like the police power, or the state-
ment that the business concerned has been dedicated to a pub-
lic use .... But police power is often used in a wide sense to
cover and, as I said, to apologize for the general power of the
legislature to make a part of the community uncomfortable by
a change."
"I do not believe in such apologies. I think the proper
course is to recognize that a state legislature can do whatever
it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by some express pro-
hibition in the Constitution of the United States or of the State,
and the Courts should be careful not to extend such prohibitions
beyond their obvious meaning by reading into them conceptions
of public policy that the particular Court may happen to enter-
tain.... The truth seems to me to be that, subject to compensa-
tion when compensation is due, the legislature may forbid or
restrict any business when it has a sufficient force of public
opinion behind it.
''38
Unlike some who came before and after him, Holmes would not
restrict due process to its orthodox procedural context. He may
have thought it futile, to attempt so lost a cause. For whatever
reason, the Justice confined his efforts to the more feasible task of
objectifying and broadening the standards of substantive due
process. Divorcing it from the "accident" of judges' economic pre-
dilection, he would fill its inherent "void" with content especially
befitting a polity grounded on the total thinking processes of
society. The Constitution was "made for people of fundamentally
differing views." It guaranteed free expression of those views to
facilitate formation of an informed consensus of opinion as the
basis of government. When most members of the community after
free discussion were in agreement upon the need for economic
regulation, who were judges to interpose an improvised due pro-
cess prohibition? Holmes would limit judicial interference in such
cases to those rare instances when the democratic process of dis-
38. See Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 445-446 (1927) (dissenting
opinion). For a "compensation when compensation is due" opinion by Holmes,
see Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393 (1922).
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cussion and consensus had so misfired as to produce results that
no reasonable man could support:
"I think that ... the [due process clause of the] Fourteenth
Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural
outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a
rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute
proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have
been understood by the traditions of our people and our law.
It does not need research to show that no such sweeping con-
demnation can be passed upon the [maximum hour for bakers]
statute before us. A reasonable man might think it a proper
measure on the score of health. Men whom I certainly could
not pronounce unreasonable would uphold it as a first instal-
ment of a general regulation of the hours of work."'",
If to a layman the reasonable man standard appears as slippery
as judicial predilection, it is not so in the ancient tradition of the
common law of which Holmes was master. Recognizing that judi-
cial review was an established part of our constitutional system,
the Justice knew all too well its tendency to degenerate into judi-
cial surpremacy. And so to respect the one and guard against the
other he resorted to that tried and true principle of the common
law which protects jury findings from intrusion by judges. Thus
a legislative determination of economic relationships, like a jury
verdict, must stand as against due process objections regardless of
how erroneous it may seem to judges, unless they are prepared
to hold that no reasonable person could have found as the legis-
lature, or jury, did find. Thus Holmes equates the two great insti-
tutions of an ancient heritage of freedom. For him jury and legis-
lature-the authentic voices of the people-have the same funda-
mental sanctity, the same substantial independence of judicial fiat.
As the Justice's leading disciple put it, "In the day-to-day working
of our democracy it is vital that the power of the non-democratic
organ of our government be exercised with vigorous self-re-
straint."4" Just as it is a basic function of juries to temper general
law with concrete justice as understood by the community, so it
is a function of legislatures z:o conserve the Constitution by keep-
ing it alive to popular aspirations.
Of course due process was not the only chink through which
pseudo-laissez-faire crept into the Constitution. The division of
powers between nation and states was also susceptible of interpre-
tation in ways thoroughly compatible with the view that business-
39. See note 37 supra.
40. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter in A. F. of L. v. American Sash & Door
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men should have special immunity from both congressional and
local regulation. Thus when Congress sought to discourage the use
of child labor by excluding its products from the channels of inter-
state commerce five members of the Supreme Court held that to be
an undue interference with "states' rights." 4 ' Here was a reversal
of the Tenth Amendment, an expression of the concept that has
been called dual federalism. For in effect the Court was saying that
the reserved powers of the states limit, or measure, the expressly
delegated powers of the nation. The Constitution provides the exact
opposite. Mr. Justice Holmes, with three associates, dissented:
"The act does not meddle with anything belonging to the
States. They may regulate their internal affairs and their domes-
tic commerce as they like. But when they seek to send their
products across the state line they are no longer within their
rights. If there were no Constitution and no Congress their
power to cross the line would depend upon their neighbors.
Under the Constitution such commerce belongs not to the States
but to Congress to regulate. It may carry out its views of pub-
lic policy whatever indirect effect they may have upon the
activities of the States. Instead of being encountered by a pro-
hibitive tariff at her boundaries the State encounters the public
policy of the United States which it is for Congress to express.
If, as has been the case within the memory of men still living,
a State should take a different view of the propriety of sustain-
ing a lottery from that which generally prevails, I cannot be-
lieve that the fact would require a different decision from that
reached in Champion v. Ames. Yet in that case [as re the
tariff] it would be said with quite as much force as in this that
Congress was attempting to intermeddle with the State's do-
mestic affairs. The national welfare as understood by Congress
may require a different attitude within its sphere from that of
some self-seeking State. It seems to me entirely constitutional
for Congress to enforce its understanding by all the means at its
command." 42
To be sure when the national tariff come before the Court,43 its
validity was sustained though, of course, it "meddled" with state
affairs quite as much as did restrictions on the shipment of child
made goods. Thus laissez-faire on the bench accurately reflected
the ambivalence of businessmen. For as Bryce had observed, "one-
half of the capitalists are occupied in preaching laissez-faire as
Co., 335 U. S. 538, 542, 555 (1949) (concurring opinion).
41. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918).
42. Id. at 281.
43. University of Illinois v. United States, 288 U. S. 48 (1933) ; Hamp-
ton v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928).
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regards railroad control [or labor legislation], the other in resisting
it-in tariff matters. .. ."
But if Holmes' Court took a dim view of national power when
Congress sought to regulate business,44 its views on that subject
were generous where such an attitude served to invalidate state
economic controls. Thus when Pennsylvania undertook to prevent
fraud in the local sale of steamship tickets, the Court found "direct"
interference with the dormant commerce power of Congress.
43
Holmes, Brandeis and Stone objected:
"The statute is an exertion of the police power of the state.
Its evident purpose is to prevent a particular species of
fraud. .. ."
"The statute is not an obstruction of commerce. It does not
discriminate against foreign commerce. It does not affect the
commerce except indirectly. Congress could, of course, deal with
the subject, because it is connected with foreign commerce.
But it has not done so. . . . Thus there can be no contention
that Congress has occupied the field. And obviously, also, this
is not a case in which the silence of Congress can be interpreted
as a prohibition of state action.... If Pennsylvania must sub-
mit to seeing its citizens defrauded, it is not because Congress
has so willed, but because the Constitution so commands. [We]
... cannot believe that it does ....
"In this case the traditional test of the limit of state action
by inquiring whether the interference with commerce is direct
or indirect seems . . . [to us] too mechanical, too uncertain in
its application, and too remote from actualities, to be of value.
In thus making use of the expressions, "direct" and "indirect
interference" with commerce, we are doing little more than
using labels to describe a result rather than any trustworthy
formula by which it is reached." 4
But it is not to be supposed that Holmes was insensitive to the
44. In Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375 (1905) a unanimous
bench went along with Holmes in the most generous view of the national
power to regulate business that the Court had ever taken. One suspects that
some of the laissez-faire Justices must have felt compelled to do so for political
reasons. The legislation in question was designed to protect farmers from sharp
business practices at the stockyards. It would not have been politic to antago-
nize both farmers and workingmen. The Lochner case was decided during
the same year. Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161 (1908) was soon to
come. Both were bitter blows to labor.
Holmes' position in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S.
197, 400 (1904) does not result from a narrow view of the commerce power,
but from the common law lawyer's strict interpretation of statutes. The
latter position is perfectly compatible with a deep respect for democracy-
when democracy speaks it must speak clearly, lest statutory "interpretation"
become another vehicle for the assertion of judicial supremacy.
45. Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U. S. 34 (1927).
46. Ibid.
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danger of the balkanization of America through state interference
with national affairs-nor that, like Chief Justice Taney,47 he
would leave such problems for adjustment by Congress. In a well
known paragraph he expressed his conception of the federal (as
distinct from the due process) limits on state activity:
"I do not think the United States would come to an end if
we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think
the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that
declaration as to the laws of the several States. For one in my
place sees how often a local policy prevails with those who are
not trained to national views and how often action is taken
that embodies what the Commerce Clause was meant to end."4
"Experiments that an important part of the community desires, in
the insulated chambers afforded by the several States ' ' 9 were one
thing for Holmes; poaching on the national preserve was some-
thing else. That distinction is clear. But, initially at least, it is
startling to find the Justice, normally so deferential to legislative
processes, silently dissenting in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western
Maryland Railway.0 For there unbelievably the Court upheld
Congressional power to override a judicial finding as to what con-
stitutes undue local impediments on national commerce. How Con-
gress can authorize what the Court has found to be constitutionally
prohibited is a problem which the Court's opinion does not fully
explain, and which to this day, though accepted,51 has not been
elucidated from the bench. The tour de force presumably was too
much for Holmes.
Such in brief outline was the jurisprudence of Mr. Justice
Holmes. Its bedrock foundation was humility and skepticism. One's
private "can't helps" are not necessarily the final truth. Certitude
is not the test of certainty. Accordingly, the Justice stood for free
trade in ideas and the sanctity of economic legislation which em-
bodied those thoughts that prevailed in the competition of the
open market. Recognizing that all ideas are an incitement, that
many are "dangerous" to the status quo, he would outlaw only
those which in a given context threaten danger so immediately as
to prevent the normal curative process of competition with others.
47. The License Cases, 5 How. 504, 579 (U.S. 1847).
48. Holmes, Law and the Court in Collected Legal Papers 295-296
(1920).
49. See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 342-343 (1921) (dissenting
opinion).
50. 242 U. S. 311 (1917).
51. Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408 (1946) and
cases cited therein.
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Recognizing, too, that judicial review was an accepted part of our
constitutional system, he was deeply aware of its abuse by his
associates on the bench. And so he would restrict it (unless the
Constitutional text was clear) to cases in which democracy had
so misfired as to produce legislation that no reasonable person could
support. Finally, the duality of a federal system induced his will-
ingness to referee when a part interferred with the whole, i.e.,
when a state experiment spilled over the bounds of its insulated
chamber and impinged upon supra-state interests which belong
to the entire people as a national unit. All of Holmes' emphasis
was upon freedom to dream, to experiment and to grow. Thorough-
ly grounded in the history of the common law, he had learned its
great lesson well-only those institutions may hope for prosperous
survival which accommodate the sense and aspirations of the people.
Epilogue
As the age of Victoria cane to an end Holmes, John Dewey,
Thorstein Veblen, Charles Beard, and James Harvey Robinson
led a pragmatic revolt against formalism, abstraction and deduc-
tive methodology in the social sciences. They would wipe out the
remnants of conceptualism and syllogistic reasoning by emphasiz-
ing that "the life of science, economics and law was not logic but
experience. . . ." Dewey would free philosophy of metaphysics and
dedicate it to social engineering. Veblen undercut the foundations
of classical economics. "Robinson was an ally in the humanization
of society and knowledge; Beard punctured myths about legal
institutions which blocked social change; and Holmes recognized
the legislative power of judges and challenged the view that law
was a deduction from divinely ordained principles of ethics." 2
What they had in common positively was a deep appreciation for
the inductive methods of modern science, and the non-Euclidian
impact of history, economics, and cultural environment upon human
institutions and ideas. Work'ng for the most part independently
of one another, they were on occasion unwilling to accept each
other's conclusions. 3 It was not so much the logical coherence
of their respective views that gave them victory-it was rather the
manner in which their common approach promised freedom from
the tyranny of anachronistic dogma and the rise of a more rational
society. Having carried most of the field in the years prior to
52. White, Social Thought in America; The Revolt Against Formalism
11, 238 (1949).
53. Thus, for example, Veblen notwithstanding, Holmes accepted the
major tenets of classical economics.
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World War II, their accomplishments now seem commonplace.
Indeed many have forgotten (a few have rejoiced in) the strictures
against which Holmes and the others fulminated. And so it hap-
pens that now in the context of different problems we hear an
occasional potshot at the things for which they stood.
What critics of the pragmatic revolt particularly resent is its
positivism-its insistence that morality is not less moral, nor law
less legal, for being the product of a human community right here
on earth. Such criticism is based on the concept of an absolute-
Natural Law-to which human moral and legal systems must con-
form at their peril. In short, only that ethics is truly binding which
springs from some transcendentally "natural" workshop. As a
matter of history he who takes this position finds it necessary to
recognize some authoritarian human agency (if only himself) to
"interpret" his supermundane codes and characteristically deals
somewhat sharply with dissenters. For it is the fate of closed sys-
tems of thought to be plagued with "heretics."
The current attacks upon pragmatism in the social sciences re-
call the struggle of the physical sciences not so long ago to free
themselves from the "eternal truths" of Aristotle and the confines
of deductive reasoning. They are true to the tradition which runs
from the condemnation of Socrates and the banishment of Galileo,
down through the "anti-evolution" laws and the Monkey Trial, to
the recent censoring of Alebrt Einstein as "an old faker." It is im-
portant to notice that Holmes' hecklers do not ground themselves
on anything like the old Roman .jus gentium form of natural law-
an inductively derived and pragmaticly tested common denominator
of a host of different, earthly cultures. Theirs, rather, is a "brood-
ing omnipresence in the sky," a metaphysical construct reflecting
(one suspects) the very parochial needs of a disintegrating Thir-
teenth Century European culture. Since then it has meant all
things to all men which raises serious difficulties for those who fear
that variation proves subjectivity.
Certainly in the confusing ideological conflicts of the cold war
era, as in the troubled days of Aquinas, efforts to find comfort in an
absolute compel sympathy. 4 But can there be more in our absolutes
54. A constantly repeated theme in the latest attack upon Holmes ap-
pears to be that pragmatism offers no comfort or consolation. See Lucey,
Holnzcs-Liberal--Hitmaitarian;-Believer in. Democracy?, 39 Geo. L. J.
523, 528, 529, 536, 538 especially, 555-557 (1951). But does the validity of a
philosophy depend upon its ability to comfort or console? If Father Lucey
thinks so, he is far more of a pragmatist than he purports to be. Reversing
Hobbes, he apparently bases his natural law system on a pragmatic foundation.
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than human fear and frustration put into them? Is there anything
in the difference between "is" and "ought" than the familiar
phenomena called cultural lag.-yesterday's winged "ought" being
the slovenly "is" of today and so on ad infinitum? In any case,
surely "oughts" are the concern of law-making (legislative), not
law-enforcing (courts), branches of government. Otherwise the
"independence" of judges would be an affront to the basic prin-
ciple of democratic self-government.
One of the latest of the potshots at pragmatism is the attack
upon Holmes by Mr. Harold R. McKinnon of the San Francisco
Bar.' - So thoroughly sound was the Justice in the context of his
times that even Mr. McKinnon recognizes Holmes' "judicial work"
was "right," insisting only that his "legal theory" was "wrong."
5 0
It follows that a majority of the great dissenter's associates made
"wrong" decisions though by Mr. McKinnon's standards they had
the "right" philosophy.
Having demolished the infidel Holmes, Mr. McKinnon might
profitably turn his attention to the true believers who sat with
Holmes-those faithful advocates of Natural Law who differ with
Mr. McKinnon on its meaning. Whose reading is it to be, Mr.
Justice Sutherland's, Mr. McKinnon's or John Doe's? A democrat
might answer, "That which prevails in the competition of a free
intellectual market, i.e., what most people in the community will
accept as just after opportunity for the intellectual cross-fertiliza-
tion that comes with free discussion." But Mr. McKinnon has only
contempt for the ethical views of "the people. 5 7 The alternatives,
of course, are anarchy or authoritarianism. It seems never to have
occurred to our critic that both the people and their political repre-
sentatives might have natural law insights-that judges do not
necessarily have an exclusive monopoly in that realm. Indeed, if
one insists upon medieval terminology, it may be said that Holmes'
genius consists precisely in his attacks upon the judicial monopoli-
zation of natural law. For if the Justice's words are read in the
context of time and place, it is clear that they were directed not so
much against natural law as against the judicial perversion of it.
55. See McKinnon, The Secret of Mr. Justice Holmes, 36 A. B. A. J.
261 (1950). See also Palmer, Hobbes, Holnes and Hitler, 31 A. B. A. J. 569
(1945) ; Lucey, Natural Law and Ainerican Legal Realism, 30 Geo. L. J.
493 (1942) ; Ford, The Fundanumtals of Holmes' Juristic Philosophy in
Phases of American Culture 51 (1942).
56. McKinnon, supra note 55, at 345. See also 343, 344.
57. Id. at 264, 343, 345.
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To leap word-fences and come to grips with the reality that lies
behind them is a lesson that young Oliver must have learned in the
revolt which his father and "Uncle Waldo" Emerson led against
the N\ew England perversion of puritanism. The difficulty is that
the great concept of natural law may be, and on the bench as else-
where often has been, perverted into an elastic formulary to sugar-
coat a narrow and sometimes selfish parochialism. It is one thing
to press natural law against a king who purports to rule by divine
right; to urge it in conjunction with judicial supremacy 5s to
frustrate democratic self-government is something quite different.
To urge one's personal absolute as a norm against which to dis-
cuss earthly justice is quite different from insisting upon it as the
only true and binding ethics. Finally, we may accept the idea of
natural law without adopting the view that it is somehow "natural"
only to judges and not to voters or their political representatives.
For Mr. Justice Holmes morality was not less moral for being
the product of the human community in which he lived. He did
not require the occult to bolster his sense of decency, nor to justify
his faith in the perfectibility of man. He preferred to formulate his
major premises not from preconceptions, but from experience and
observation. True to the democratic tradition, he honored the in-
quiring mind-for him there were no heretics. His skepticism was in
the ancient Greek tradition that questioning is the road to knowl-
edge. He "had the moral courage to accept uncertainty and the
intellectual humility to know that he could not know-This is
Truth." -"
58. I use the term as Att'y Gen. (now Mr. Justice) Jackson used it in his,
The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy (1941).
59. See Rodell, Justice Holnes and His Hecklers, 60 Yale L. J. 620(1951).
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